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This paper gives a survey of insights into inter-firm alliances and networks for innovation, 
from a constructivist, interactionist perspective on knowledge, which leads to the notion of 
‘cognitive distance’. It looks at both the competence and the governance side of relationships.   
Given cognitive distance, organizations need to align cognition sufficiently to enable the fast 
and efficient utilization of opportunities from complementary capabilities. This, I propose, is 
done by means of a culturally mediated ‘organizational cognitive focus’. The problem with 
that is that it yields a greater or lesser organizational myopia that, for the sake of innovation, 
needs to be complemented by means of outside relations with other firms, at larger cognitive 
distance. Hence the importance of networks for innovation. On the governance side, the paper 
gives a review of relational risks and instruments to manage them. Next to the effects of 
cognitive distance, the paper analyses the effects of density and strength of ties in innovation 
networks, concerning both competence and governance.  
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Increasingly, it has been recognized that firms need outside relationships for innovation, in the 
development of new products, production processes, markets, or forms of organization, and 
for learning, in the development of new competencies. That is the subject of the present 
chapter. The subject is covered by a large literature (Lundvall 1988, Porter 1990, Hamel & 
Prahalad 1990, Hamel 1991, Kogut & Zander 1992, Nooteboom 1992, Hagedoorn 1993, 
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad 1994, Nooteboom 1999, Ahuja 2000, Rowley et al. 2000, 
Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002, Duysters & de Man 2003). The basic idea that for innovation 
firms need to open up to outside relationships, which goes back at least as far as Lundvall 
(1988), has recently received a new buzz-word label of ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough 2003). 
  In innovation, it is useful to distinguish between exploitation, with incremental 
improvements on existing dominant designs, and exploration, with radical breakthroughs that 
develop into new dominant designs (March 1991). On the firm level exploration may, for 
example, be operationalized as patents in patent classes in which the firm did not have patents 
before (e.g. in Nooteboom et al. 2005). On an industry level, exploration may be 
operationalized as an innovation ‘new to the world’, as is the custom in innovation statistics. 
In learning, it is customary to distinguish between learning by communication, i.e. the 
acquisition from others of knowledge that is already available, and ‘experiential learning’ that 
may generate new knowledge by discovery or invention. Similar to the distinction between 
exploitation and exploration, the literature on organization yields the distinction between   2 
‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris & Schön 1978). The former preserves a 
mental frame, basic design, logic or architecture, while the latter breaks through to novel basic 
principles. A fundamental, key question is how the latter may emerge from the former, or how 
exploitation may lead to exploration (Nooteboom 2000).      
  For outside means and conditions for innovation, not only alliances are relevant, but also 
conditions of national innovation systems (NIS) and conditions of location (‘externalities’), in 
regional innovation systems (RIS). There are large literatures on both, but these will not be 
included in the present chapter, which focuses on inter-firm relationships. Inter-firm 
relationships for learning and innovation clearly go beyond inter-organizational dyads, to 
include network effects, i.e. effects of the structure and strength of ties between firms, and 
interactions between structure and strength. That is included in the present chapter, and on that 
subject also there is a large literature (e.g. Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992, Powell & Smith-Doer 
1994, Powell et al. 1996, Uzzi 1996, 1997, Koza & Lewin 1998, Oliver & Ebers 1998, Ebers 
1999, Ahuja 2000, Rowley et al. 2000, Rothaermel 2001, Duysters et al. 2001, Beerkens 
2004, Nooteboom 2004a).  
The purpose of the present chapter is to give a survey of this complex field of alliances and 
networks for innovation, without being able to claim a complete survey of its vast literature, 
with an emphasis on a coherent causal analysis that integrates at least some of the many 
factors that have been found to play a role. In particular, it will look at issues of both 
competence, which are clearly central in innovation and learning, which is about developing 
competence, and governance, concerning the management of relational risk, which cannot be 
ignored (Williamson 1999, Nooteboom 2004b). For example, the role of network structure 
cannot be properly understood in looking only at either competence or governance. Density of 
ties, for example, may obstruct the flexibility and variety needed for learning, but may also be 
needed for trust, reputation or shared norms for the sake of governance. 
The chapter employs multiple perspectives, from economics, sociology and cognitive 
science. Economics is needed for considerations of efficiency, sociology for interaction, and 
cognitive science because learning is, after all, the central issue.   
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it summarizes the constructivist, interactionist view 
of knowledge employed in this chapter. That is a crucial step. According to that view, 
cognition is based on categories that re constructed in interaction with the world, particularly 
interaction between people. Since people construct their cognition along different life 
trajectories, through different environments, they differ in their cognition to the extent that 
those paths are different. In other words, there is greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’ between 
people (Nooteboom 1992, 1999).  
Second, this chapter looks at the implications for the firm, from the perspective of both 
competence and governance, and its need for outside relations, from a competence 
perspective. Given cognitive distance, organizations need to align cognition sufficiently to 
enable the fast and efficient utilization of opportunities from complementary capabilities. 
This, I propose, is done by means of a culturally mediated ‘organizational cognitive focus’. 
The problem with that is that it yields a greater or lesser organizational myopia that, for the 
sake of innovation, needs to be complemented by means of outside relations with other firms, 
at larger cognitive distance (Nooteboom 1992). Hence the importance of networks for 
innovation.  
Third, this chapter looks at the governance side of relations, in a review of relational risks 
and instruments to manage them. One relational risk results from resource dependence on 
partners, some of which may result from relation-specific investments in the relationship, as 
argued in transaction cost economics (TCE). While TCE neglects innovation, it will be argued 
that under innovation, additional kinds of relation-specific investments arise, in building 
mutual understanding across cognitive distance, and in building relation-specific trust.     3 
Fourth, this chapter analyzes in more detail the sources of novelty in IOR’s, in particular 
the role of variety and cognitive distance, as both an opportunity, for competence, and a 
problem, for both competence and governance. Here, it also analyses the effects of density 
and strength of ties in innovation networks, concerning both competence and governance. The 




Since organizational learning pertains to cognition, it stands to reason that we should look to 
cognitive science for requisite insight. Here, a possible misunderstanding of terminology 
should be eliminated from the start. In this chapter, the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognition’ 
have a wide meaning, going beyond rational calculation. They denote a broad range of mental 
activity, including proprioception (grasp, touch, grip, etc.), perception, sense making, 
categorisation, inference, value judgments, and emotions.  
Concerning competence and knowledge I adopt a ‘situated action’, ‘constructivist’ view of 
cognition, as most authors do in the literature on organisational cognition and learning (for 
surveys, see Hedberg 1981, Cohen & Sproull 1998, Meindl, Stubbard & Porac 1998). 
‘Situated action’ entails that knowledge and meaning are embedded in specific contexts of 
action, which yield background knowledge, as part of absorptive capacity, which cannot be 
fully articulated, and always retain a ‘tacit dimension’ (Polanyi 1962). This view is also 
adopted, in particular, in the literature on ‘Communities of practice’ (COP, Brown & Duguid 
1991, 1996, Lave & Wenger 1991, Wenger & Snyder 2000). According to a social 
constructivist view of knowledge, people 
1.  construct their cognitive categories, or mental models, by which they perceive, 
interpret and evaluate phenomena, 
2.  in interaction with their physical and, especially, their social environment.  
 
The resulting mental frameworks constitute ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990). People can turn information into knowledge only by assimilating it into those 
frameworks, and thereby they shape and mold it. Consequently, to the extent that people have 
developed their cognition in different environments or conditions, they interpret, understand 
and evaluate the world differently (Berger & Luckmann 1966). As a result, there is greater or 
lesser ‘cognitive distance’ between people (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). 
The constructivist view goes back to the work of Piaget and Vygotsky, in developmental 
psychology, and the ‘symbolic interactionism’ of G.H Mead (1934), in sociology, and has 
later been called the ‘experiential’ view of knowledge (Kolb 1984) and the ‘activity’ view 
(Blackler 1995). More recent work in neural science is providing further scientific 
underpinnings of the constructivist perspective, by showing how it works in terms of the 
development of neural structures, in what is becoming known as the perspective of ‘embodied 
cognition’ (Damasio 1995, 2003, Edelman 1987, 1992, Lakoff & Johnson 1999). A key 
characteristic of embodied cognition is that it sees cognition as rooted in brain and body, 
which are in turn embedded in their external environment. This is consistent with the ‘situated 
action’ perspective indicated above.  
 
A cognitive view of organizations and IOR’s 
 
Economic theories of organization, in particular transaction cost economics (TCE), look at 
organisations as systems for governance, to reduce transaction costs, by means of incentives, 
monitoring and control. However, professional work requires considerable autonomy for its 
execution and is hard for managers to monitor and evaluate. Rapid innovation increases   4 
uncertainty of contingencies and makes formal governance, especially governance by 
contract, difficult to specify, which increases the need for collaboration on the basis of 
personal trust. If specification of detailed contracts is nevertheless undertaken, it threatens to 
form a straightjacket that constrains the scope for innovation. Furthermore, the attempt to use 
contracts to constrain opportunism tends to evoke mistrust that is retaliated by mistrust, while 
in view of uncertainty there is a need to use trust rather than contract.   
Beyond governance, there are implications for competence. If the situated action view of 
competence is true, then canonical rules, i.e. all-encompassing and codified rules, for 
executing work are an illusion, since they can never cover the richness and variability of 
situated practice, which require informal improvisation and workarounds that have a large 
tacit component that cannot be included in codification of rules, as recognized in the literature 
on COP (Brown & Duguid 1991). The proof of this lies in the fact that ‘work to rule’ is a 
form of sabotage.   
Using the perspective of embodied cognition, the view in this chapter is that organization 
functions primarily as a cognitive ‘focusing device’, for reasons of both competence and 
governance. In order to achieve a specific joint goal, on a higher level than basic needs, the 
categories of thought (of perception, interpretation and value judgment), of the people 
involved must to some extent be aligned (Kogut & Zander 1992, Nooteboom 1992, 2000). 
Alignment entails that cognitive distance must be limited, to a greater or lesser extent.  
The main purpose of organizational focus is to reduce cognitive distance, in order to 
achieve a sufficient alignment of mental categories, to understand each other, utilise 
complementary capabilities and achieve a common goal. Note that, given the wide notion of 
cognition used here, focus has perceptual, intellectual and normative content. It includes 
views of how people ‘deal with each other around here’.  
To achieve such focus, organisations develop their own specialised semiotic systems, in 
language, symbols, metaphors, myths, and rituals. This is what we call organisational culture. 
This differs between organisations to the extent that they have different goals and have 
accumulated different experiences, in different industries, technologies and markets. 
Organisational culture incorporates fundamental views and intuitions regarding the relation 
between the firm and its environment (‘locus of control’: is the firm master or victim of its 
environment), attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge (objective or constructed), the nature 
of man (loyal or self-interested) and of relations between people (rivalrous or collaborative), 
which inform content and process of strategy, organisational structure, and styles of decision-
making and coordination (Schein 1985).  
  Organizational focus also has functions of selection and adaptation. In selection, it selects 
people, in recruitment but often on the basis of self-selection of personnel joining the 
organization because they feel affinity with it, and adaptation, in the socialisation into the 
firm, and training, of incoming personnel.  
Elements of this idea of organization are not new. It connects with the idea, in the 
organisation literature, that the crux of an organisation is to serve as a ‘sensemaking system’ 
(Weick 1979, 1995), a ‘system of shared meaning’ (Smircich 1983) or ‘interpretation system’ 
(Choo 1998). I propose that this yields a more fundamental reason for firms to exist than the 
reduction of transaction costs, although transaction costs are also part of the story 
(Nooteboom 2000). In a firm, people need to achieve a common purpose, and for this they 
need some more or less tacit shared ways of seeing and interpreting the world and regulating 
collaboration.  
Note that the notion of organisational focus does not entail the need for people to agree on 
everything, or see everything the same way. Indeed, such lack of diversity would prevent both 
division of labor and innovation within the firm. As discussed in Nooteboom (1999) there is a 
trade-off between cognitive distance, needed for variety and novelty of cognition, and   5 
cognitive proximity, needed for mutual understanding and agreement. In fact, different people 
in a firm will to a greater or lesser extent introduce elements of novelty from their outside 
lives and experience, and this is a source of both error and innovation (Dimaggio 1997). 
Nevertheless, there are some things they have to agree on, and some views, often tacit, which 
they need to share, on goals, norms, values, standards, outputs, competencies and ways of 
doing things.   
An implication of the notion of a firm as a focusing device is that the need to achieve a 
focus entails a risk of myopia: relevant threats and opportunities to the firm are not perceived. 
To compensate for this, people, and firms, need complementary sources of outside 
intelligence, to utilise ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 1992). This yields a 
new perspective on inter-organisational relationships, next to the usual considerations, known 
from the alliance literature. This perspective is consonant with the notion of double 
embeddedness, indicated before, of minds in organisation, and organisations in outside 
networks. It also fits well with the prevalent idea in the literature on innovation systems that 
innovation derives primarily from interaction between firms (Lundvall 1988).  
Concerning the boundaries of the firm, the present theory yields a prediction that is opposite 
to that of classical transaction cost economics, and which is particularly relevant in 
innovation. With increasing uncertainty, in terms of volatility of technology and markets, 
firms should not integrate activities more, as transaction cost theory predicts, but less, because 
the need to utilise outside complementary cognition is greater. The argument from TCE was 
that under uncertainty one needs the greater power of management by fiat within a firm, to 
monitor behaviour and resolve conflicts. Here, the counter-argument is that under the 
volatility of innovation the risk or organizational myopia is greater and hence there is a 
greater need for outside complementary cognition, with ‘external economy of cognitive 
scope’.  The prediction of less rather than more integration under uncertainties of innovation 
has been confirmed empirically by Colombo & Garrone (1998), who found that in 
technologically volatile industries, as measured by patent intensity, the likelihood of alliances 
rather than mergers and acquisitions is higher than in the absence of such volatility. 
Implications of the theory for the size of the firm, and for differences between large and 




Even when the focus is on competence, as here, in the study of learning and innovation in 
IOR’s, issues of governance, concerning relational risk, cannot be ignored, because 
innovation has implications for forms of governance, which in turn have implications for the 
content, strength and structure of ties between firms. For a discussion of governance we must 
first turn to the risks that governance aims to control.  
There are two fundamental kinds of risk: of holdup and of spillover. As defined in TCE, 
the problem of hold-up results from dependence, in the form of switching costs: if the 
relationship breaks, costs have to be incurred anew. Switching costs are caused, in particular, 
by investments that are specific to the relationship.. Next to the types of specific investment 
recognized in TCE (in location specificity, tangible asset specificity, and human asset 
specificity), in innovation specific assets are needed to develop mutual understanding, under 
conditions where knowledge is in flux, and to build up personal trust, under conditions where 
uncertainty precludes governance by contract and reputation mechanisms are not yet in place, 
while both may be highly relation-specific.  
In relationships, one may also lose a hostage, mostly in the form of sensitive information, 
particularly in innovation. There are also opportunity costs: the loss of the value that the 
current partner offers relative to the next best alternative. This depends on the availability of   6 
alternative partners, or the possibility of conducting an activity oneself, and the extent that the 
partner offers something unique.  
Spillover risk entails that knowledge that constitutes competitive advantage, as part of core 
competence, reaches competitors and is used by them for imitation and competition. That is of 
particular relevance in innovation. The risk may be direct, in the partner becoming a 
competitor, or indirect, in networks, with knowledge spilling over to a competitor via a 
partner. In the past, many firms have been overly concerned with spillover risk. First of all, 
one should realise that to get knowledge one must offer knowledge. The question is not how 
much knowledge one loses, but what the net balance is of giving and receiving knowledge. 
Second, when knowledge is tacit it spills over less easily, or is more ‘sticky’ (Utterback 1981, 
von Hippel 1988, Brown & Duguid 2001) than when it is documented. However, even then it 
can spill over, for example when the staff or the division in which the knowledge is embedded 
are poached, or when the staff involved have more allegiance to their professional colleagues, 
also in rival firms, than to the interests of the firm (Grey & Garsten 2001), or professional 
vanity leads them to divulge too much in meetings with outside colleagues. Furthermore, the 
question is not whether information reaches a competitor but whether he will also be able to 
understand it, i.e. turn it into knowledge, and to turn that it into effective competition. For this 
he needs to understand it, and his absorptive capacity may not enable that (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990). There may be ‘causal ambiguity’ (Lippman & Rumelt 1982). Next, he will need to 
effectively implement it in his organization. And finally, if by that time the knowledge has 




In the IOR literature there is a big and ongoing debate on the question to what extent 
governance is a matter of control, on the basis of the deterrence of opportunism, or can go 
beyond that, in trust based on solidarity or benevolence. According to TCE, it is impossible to 
reliably judge possible limits to other people’s opportunism, and therefore trust does not yield 
a reliable safeguard (Williamson 1975: 31-37). If trust goes beyond calculative self-interest, it 
yields blind, unconditional trust, which is not wise and will not survive in markets 
(Williamson 1993).  From a social science perspective, many others take the view that trust is 
viable, without necessarily becoming blind or unconditional (Macauley 1963, Deutsch 1973, 
Granovetter 1973, Ouchi 1980, Gambetta 1988, Bradach and Eccles 1989, Helper 1990, Hill 
1990, Bromiley and Cummings 1992, Murakami and Rohlen 1992, Dyer and Ouchi 1993, 
Ring and Van de Ven 1992, 1994, Gulati 1995, McAllister 1995, Chiles and McMackin 1996, 
Noorderhaven 1996, Nooteboom et. al.1997, Das & Teng 1998, 2001, Nooteboom 1999, 
2002). A committed partner does not immediately exit from the relationship in case of 
unforeseen opportunities or problems, but engages in ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1979, Helper 1987).  
What are the sources of collaboration? On what basis do people rely on each other? 
Reliance may have rational reasons and psychological causes, and combinations of them. The 
psychological causes go beyond the present chapter. For rational reliance it is important to 
know what reasons people may have to act in a reliable fashion, i.e. to act to the best of their 
competence to satisfy expectations. Adapting a scheme proposed by Williams (1988), 
Nooteboom (2002) proposed the scheme of reasons for intentional reliability that is specified 
in Table 1. Note that instruments and concepts from TCE have been built in. While 
governance goes beyond control, it still includes it.  
 
-------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
--------------------------   7 
 
Reasons for reliability are split in two ways. One split is between micro, particularistic, 
relation-specific reasons, and macro, universalistic, institutional reasons, outside the 
relationship. The second split is between extrinsic self-interested motives, by which a trustor 
can try to control a trustee, and more intrinsic motives, whereby the trustee may feel little 
inclination towards opportunism, from a motivation to act loyally or benevolently. This 
distinction between self-interested motives, which yield a basis for control, and motives to act 
benevolently, which go beyond control, plays an important role in the trust literature, as 
indicated.  
According to Table 1, control on the basis of self-interest has two forms. One is to limit 
opportunities for opportunism, in constraint of action, by legal enforcement (macro) or 
hierarchical direct control (micro). The second is to use incentives, on the basis of reputation 
(macro) or the trustee’s own material interest in the relation, on the basis of trustor’s value to 
him, or costs of switching to a different relationship, or a risk of losing a hostage (micro). The 
role of hostages is adopted from transaction cost economics (TCE). Hostages may take the 
form of strategically sensitive information (that the trustor may threaten to divulge to trustee’s 
rivals), minority shareholding, or staff seconded by the trustee to the trustor (who may be 
poached if the trustee misbehaves). Other-directed reasons include institutions in the form of 
values and norms of decent conduct, identification with a community (macro), empathy or 
identification within a relationship (Lewicki & Bunker 1996) and routinized conduct (micro). 
Empathy may carry an affect of solidarity, and identification tends to carry an affect of 
friendship or comradeship, or at least a sense of shared destiny. Not mentioned in Table 1 is 
the possibility of using trusted third parties for intermediation or arbitration (Simmel 1950, 
Shapiro 1987, Nooteboom 2002).  
 
The context of innovation makes special demands, and imposes limits, on the 
configuration of instruments. The high uncertainty involved in, especially radical, innovation, 
entails that the specification of contracts is problematic, and can constrain the scope of 
innovation when imposed anyway. Hierarchical control also is problematic because 
monitoring is problematic, due either to the high level of professional labour involved, when 
the level of technology is high, or the condition that knowledge is typically highly tacit in 
innovation, or the condition that knowledge can be greatly in flux, in innovation, or all three 
in combination. Under the high flux of knowledge and entry and exit of players that is typical 
of especially early stages of radical innovation, reputation mechanisms and reliable third 
parties (reliable in both competence and fairness) may not yet be in place. If all those 
instruments from Table 1 are unavailable, one is left with the sources of benevolence, on the 
basis of institutionalized ethics or personalized trust. However, such generalization would be 
too hasty. What instruments are available depends on details of ties and structure of the 
network, to be analyzed later in this chapter. 
 
Sources of learning and innovation 
 
Here, the focus is on learning in the sense of discovery or invention, which is connected with 
innovation. Especially from an evolutionary perspective on innovation (Nelson & Winter 
1982), heterogeneity or variety is a crucial source of innovation, and this has been taken up in 
the alliance literature (Stuart & Podolny 1996, Almeida & Kogut 1999, Rosenkopf & Nerkar 
2001, Fleming 2001, Rosenkopf & Almeida 2003, Ahuja & Katila 2004). However, that 
literature does not explain how, precisely, heterogeneity produces innovation. Furthermore, 
heterogeneity in networks has two dimensions that are seldom explicitly distinguished. One is 
the number of firms involved, and the pattern of ties between them, and the other is the   8 
difference, in particular cognitive distance, between them. Between firms, in contrast with 
people, cognitive distance is the difference between the cognitive foci of firms, with two main 
dimensions of technological knowledge/competence and moral principles for internal 
governance.  
A large steam of literature has indicated only the problems rather than also the benefits of 
such cognitive distance. In a study on alliance formation in the semi-conductor industry, 
Stuart (1998) argued that the most valuable alliances are those between firms with similar 
technological foci and/or operating in similar markets, whereas distant firms are inhibited 
from cooperating effectively. In a similar vein, the diversification literature argues that most is 
to be learned from alliance partners with related knowledge and skills (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman 2005), or from areas that firms already possess capabilities in (Penner-Hahn & 
Shaver 2005). In a survey of key customer relations of 180 young technology-based firms, Yli 
et al. (2001) hypothesized that relationship quality, in terms of goodwill trust and shared 
norms and reciprocal expectations would have a positive effect on knowledge acquisition, but 
found a significant negative effect. In the literature on international business also, a pervasive 
view is that cognitive distance is a problem to be overcome. Johanson & Vahlne (1977, 1990) 
employed the notion of ‘psychological distance’, which is seen as having an adverse effect on 
cross-cultural communication. When learning is discussed, in that literature, it is mostly seen 
as learning to cope with transnational differences, by accumulating experience in cross-border 
collaboration (e.g. Barkema et al. 1997), rather than taking those differences as a potential 
source of learning to change home country products or practices.  
  Nooteboom (1999) proposed an interaction between the advantages and disadvantages of 
distance, as follows. The ability to understand each other (in absorptive capacity) and to 
collaborate declines with cognitive distance, whereas the novelty value of the relationship, i.e. 
its potential to generate Schumpeterian novel combinations, increases with distance. If the 
two effects are linear with respect to distance, and if learning or innovation performance of 
the relationship is proportional to the mathematical product of novelty value and mutual 
absorptive capacity, the result is an inverted-U shaped performance as a function of distance, 
as illustrated in Figure 1.
1 This implies an optimal cognitive distance, which is large enough 
for partners to offer each other something new, but not so large that they cannot understand 
each other or come to agreement.  
 
----------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
In Figure 1, the downward sloping line of absorptive capacity is not fixed. It is subject to 
an upward shift, as a function of the accumulation of knowledge in relevant fields and 
experience in IOR’s. That yields a shift to higher optimal cogntive distance.  
Wuyts et. al. (2005) put the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance to two empirical, 
econometric tests. The first test was conducted on a combination of the basic hypothesis of 
optimal cognitive distance with the second hypothesis that cognitive distance decreases with 
increased frequency and duration of interaction. As argued by Gulati (1995) and others 
(Simmel 1950, McAllister 1995, Lewicki & Bunker 1996), familiarity may breed trust, which 
is good for governance. However, it may also reduce variety of knowledge, which is bad for 
innovative performance. This yields the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relation between 
radical technological innovation and the extent to which firms ally with the same partners 
                                                 
1 In figure 1, the vertical axis may be a single one, of percentages, if we define absorptive capacity as the 
percentage of knowledge that can be absorbed and novelty value as the percentage of novelty. Then innovative 
performance, as the product of absorption and novelty, also results as a percentage.    9 
over time. That hypothesis was tested on data on vertical alliances between biotech and 
pharma companies, and was supported.  
In fact, the derived hypothesis is subject to nuance. If two partners have access to other, 
non-overlapping partners, so that they are continually being refreshed with new, non-
overlapping knowledge, cognitive distance between them is maintained, so that the 
relationship may remain innovative even when it lasts long. This is, in fact, the point, or part 
of the point, of Burt’s (1992) notion of bridging structural holes.  
The second test by Wuyts et al. was conducted on a combination of the basic hypothesis of 
optimal cognitive distance with a second hypothesis that the likelihood of a collaborative 
alliance increases with the expected performance of collaborative innovation. This yielded the 
derived hypothesis that the likelihood of an alliance for innovation has an inverted U-shaped 
relation with cognitive distance. That hypothesis was tested on data on horizontal alliances in 
ICT industries. Cognitive distance was measured by differences in degrees of specialisation in 
different dimensions of technology, inferred from patent data. Partial support was found. 
Technology-related measures of cognitive distance were not found to have any significant 
effect, but several indicators of differences in firms’ organisational characteristics proved to 
have the expected inverted U-shaped effect. Several considerations were offered to explain 
why organisational aspects turned out to be more important than technological ones in ICT 
industries.  
Nooteboom et al. (2005) conducted a more complete empirical, econometric test, on the 
basis of a large set of data on inter-firm alliances over a ten-year period, in a variety of 
industries. Cognitive distance was reduced to technological distance, which was measured on 
the basis of correlation between profiles of technological knowledge composed from patent 
data. Innovative performance was measured as new patents, in successive years, with a 
distinction between exploratory patents, in patent classes that are new to the firm, and 
exploitative patents, in patent classes in which a firm already has patents. Absorptive capacity 
was made endogenous, in that the downward sloping line of absorptive capacity (cf. Figure 1) 
was taken as a function of technological capital, accumulated from past R&D, measured by 
the variety of accumulated patents. The hypothesis of performance as an inverse-U shaped 
function of cognitive distance was confirmed, including the further hypotheses that optimal 
distance is higher for exploration than for exploitation, and that technological capital has a 
positive effect on absorptive capacity. The effect for exploration can de attributed to a higher 
slope of the novelty line, in Figure 1: in exploration the positive effect of cognitive distance 
on novelty value is higher.  The effect of past R&D can be attributed to an upward shift of the 
line for absorptive capacity.  
As expressed, but only in part, by the declining line of absorptive capacity and ability to 
collaborate, cognitive distance has implications for governance. Cognitive distance hinders 
monitoring and control of opportunism. Furthermore, to bridge cognitive distance, firms need 
to make investments in mutual understanding that are to a greater or lesser extent specific in 
the sense of transaction cost economics, particularly in exploration. As noted before, 
according to transaction cost logic such specific investments contribute to dependence and 
risk of hold-up. Also, again by transaction cost logic, if collaboration requires a relation-
specific investment in mutual understanding, such investment will only be elicited if partners 




Inter-firm relations go beyond dyads. There may be multiple participants and indirect linkages 
in networks. Those have implications for the value, risk and governance of relations. One may 
value a partner not for himself but for the access that he provides to others. In an alliance, one   10 
may need to assess the risk that the partner may be taken over by a competitor, possibly in an 
indirect way, in which he takes over a majority shareholder of the partner (Lorange and Roos 
1992). Spillover risk can be indirect, through partners to competitors. If one already has many 
partners, adding a new one might raise spillover risk for existing partners. The literature 
yields some puzzles concerning networks.  
 One stream of literature on networks suggests that players who span ‘structural holes’ can 
gain advantage (Burt 1992). If individuals or communities A and B are connected only by C, 
then C can take advantage of his bridging position by accessing resources that others cannot 
access, and by playing off A and B against each other. As a result, the third party is 
maximally powerful and minimally constrained in his actions. This yields Burt’s (1992) 
notion of tertius gaudens, indicated earlier by Simmel (1950).  
A central debate in the network literature is, or used to be, whether in networks for 
innovation ties should be sparse and weak (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992), or dense and strong 
(Coleman 1988). The argument in favour of sparse and weak ties is that in frequent and 
intense interaction between many actors, in a dense structure, much of the information 
circulating in the system is redundant. If A is connected to B, and B is connected to C, then A 
does not need a direct connection to C because he can access information from C through B 
(Burt 1992). The cost of redundancy, in setting up and maintaining ties, increases with the 
strength of ties. Thus, according to Burt (1992), efficiency can be created in the network by 
shedding redundant ties and selectively maintaining only a limited set of ties that bridge 
‘structural holes’. Then, time and energy are saved for developing new contacts to 
unconnected nodes. Apart from efficiency, bridging structural holes also provides advantages 
of ‘brokerage’. Also, strong, i.e. intense and long lasting ties, can lead to reduced variety and 
hence reduced potential for learning (Burt 2000). Or, in other words, and more precisely, 
strong ties can lead to too little ‘cognitive distance’ (Nooteboom 1999). Originally 
(Granovetter 1973), density and strength of ties were conflated, while later it was recognised 
that they represent separate features (Burt 1992). It is conceivable that sparse ties may be 
strong and that dense ties may be weak (Reagans & McEvily 2003). Indeed, the present 
chapter will give illustrations of that.  
According to Coleman (1988), by contrast, dense and weak ties (‘cohesion’ or ‘network 
closure’) facilitate the role of social capital such as the build-up of reputation, trust, social 
norms, and social control, e.g. by coalition formation to constrain actions, which facilitate 
collaboration.  
In this debate the empirical evidence is mixed. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) found evidence 
against redundancy in an advice network, for the acquisition of capabilities. Ahuja (2000) 
found evidence against structural holes, for innovation in collaboration. Walker et al. (1997) 
found evidence in favour of cohesion, for innovation in biotechnology. In view of these 
apparently inconsistent findings, subsequent studies have taken a ‘contingency’ approach 
(Bae & Gargiulo 2003), investigating environmental conditions that would favour the one or 
the other view (Podolny & Baron 1997, Ahuja 2000, Rowley et al. 2000, Podolny 2001, 
Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002).  
In fact, this apparently contradictory evidence is not surprising. The two opposite claims 
concerning density and strength of ties may well both be true. As noted by Burt (2000, quoted 
also by Rowley et al. 2000: 373): ‘.. the closure and hole arguments are not as contradictory 
as they might seem .. The ambiguity stems in large part from the different roles that social 
capital plays in the study populations’. More precisely, I propose here, they simply represent 
different aspects of collaboration: a competence dimension, in terms of the access to new 
knowledge, the combination of complementary competencies, joint production of new 
knowledge, and the creation of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’, and a governance 
dimension of managing relational risks of opportunism and spillover or loss of appropriability   11 
of returns on innovation. Concerning competence, particularly in exploration of novel 
opportunities, one may need weak ties, in the bridging of structural holes. For governance, 
one may need cohesion. This was also Ahuja’s (2000) argument: structural holes are less 
likely to be beneficial when overcoming opportunism is critical for success. When combining 
competence and governance perspectives, there are arguments both in favour and against 
density and strong ties, in innovation and knowledge transfer (Uzzi 1996, 1997).  
Another cause of the ambiguity of outcomes in empirical studies lies in the neglect of the 
content of ties (Gilsing & Nooteboom 2005). Hansen (1999) made a distinction between 
acquiring knowledge about and knowledge from others, i.e. between the identification of the 
location and usefulness of knowledge, and the transfer or sharing of knowledge. He, and 
earlier Uzzi (1997), argued and found empirical evidence that strong ties promote the transfer 
of complex knowledge, while weak ties promote the transfer of simple knowledge.
2  
Following sections give more recent results concerning the effects of network structure and 




Gilsing & Nooteboom (2005) offer several new hypotheses as modifications and additions to 
the extant literature on the effects of network structure and strength of ties. First, let us 
consider network structure. A first hypothesis is that networks for radical innovation or 
exploration (March 1991, Nooteboom 2000) require density of ties. There are three arguments 
from considerations of competence. First, under the radical uncertainty of exploration it has 
not yet been established what knowledge, and hence what sources, are relevant. As a result, 
one has to hedge one’s bets concerning what sources to tap, including sources that may turn 
out to be irrelevant. This is an argument for redundancy in type of sources. Second, there is 
high volatility of existence and network membership of firms, so that firms that give access to 
knowledge now may not exist tomorrow. As a result one has to hedge one’s bets concerning 
what firms will remain in existence. One may need to maintain a tie with C even if one also 
has a tie with B who also has a tie with C, to cover for the risk that B drops out for access to 
C. This is an argument for redundancy in ties. Third, under the conditions of a large variety of 
knowledge, or potential knowledge, in exploration, with large cognitive distances, one may 
need a third party to help understand a given party, by supplementing one’s absorptive 
capacity, or to check the accuracy of information. This is an argument for redundancy for 
triangulation. The argument that density enables triangulation was proposed earlier by 
Rowley et al. (2000). However, they argued that it was most important in exploitation, while 
Gilsing & Nooteboom argue that it is most important in exploration.  
Fourth, there is an argument by default: in exploration costs of redundancy matter less. 
They are typically smaller and less relevant than in exploitation. Under exploration, (specific) 
investment in a tie tends to be smaller, in mutual understanding, designing and executing 
experiments, building and testing prototypes, in comparison with investments for exploitation, 
such as investment in scaling up, efficient production systems with corresponding division 
and coordination of labour, distribution channels, brand name, and the like. Note that there is 
room for contingency here. In some industries, such as aerospace, prototyping and testing 
may require investments that are as high, or even higher, than for production. Second, costs 
are less relevant. As the innovation literature argues, in exploration competition is aimed at 
technical and commercial viability, while low cost emerges as a competitive advantage only 
later, after the market has materialised and price competition increases from new entrants who 
                                                 
2  Hansen  (1999)  associated  simple  knowledge  with  codified  knowledge  (information)  on  opportunities  regarding  where 
specific knowledge was located and by whom. Complex knowledge was associated with more tacit knowledge on in-depth 
technological issues.   12 
jump on the bandwagon of new market success (Abernathy 1978, Abernathy & Utterback 
1978, Abernathy & Clark 1985).  
There are also arguments in favour of density from considerations of governance. As 
indicated before, the literature (Coleman 1988) proposes that density favours the functioning 
of social norms, social control, coalitions, sanctions, and reputation mechanisms. These 
mechanisms of social control are particularly needed in exploration, in view of the limited 
feasibility of contractual control, due to uncertainty concerning the content and conditions of 
a contract and limited ability to assess and control contract compliance. On the other hand, 
from a governance perspective density also brings risks. Having a partner who has multiple 
partners increases his opportunities for switching, which may increase his hold-up power, 
with more ‘opportunities for opportunism’. Density also opens up more avenues for spillover, 
which may increase risk of loss of competitive advantage. However, as argued by Nooteboom 
(1999), in radical innovation change of knowledge may be so fast that spillover risk becomes 
negligible. Hold-up risk from multiple partners is limited if it is balanced, i.e. if all actors 
have such multiple partnerships, as tends to be the case in a dense network.  
Concerning other features of network structure, stability of the network should be low, 
reflecting frequent exit and entry of network participants, for the sake of novel combinations 
(see the simulation model in March 1991). Moreover, under such conditions of radical 
innovation, with uncertainty concerning what elements will emerge and survive in what 
configuration, centralization is less relevant. Centrality may also yield an obstacle to re-
configuration of ties, in attempts to maintain the power invested in established, centralized 
positions.   
For more incremental innovation, in exploitation, the arguments concerning network 
structure go in the opposite direction. The cost of redundant ties matters since competition has 
shifted to price, and the size of costs is likely to be high. Since it is now clear what knowledge 
is relevant, who has it, and network membership is more stable, there is less need to hedge 
bets by redundancy of ties. Since knowledge is more stable and diffused there is less need for 
triangulation. Concerning governance, reduction of uncertainty allows for more governance 
by contracts, lessening the need for dense ties for the sake of a reputation mechanism. As a 
result of the emergence of dominant designs and the stabilization and diffusion of knowledge, 
network stability can be larger, and centrality in the network may be needed for efficient 
coordination in division of labour, in hub-and-spoke type structures. This depends on industry 
contingencies. Centrality or some density is needed, in particular, if technology is systemic, to 
ensure that the different components of the system remain in tune with each other (Langlois & 
Robertson 1995).  
Now, let us consider tie strength. According to Granovetter, in personal networks there are 
four dimensions of tie strength: ‘amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual 
confiding) and reciprocal services’ (Granovetter 1973: 1361). Gilsing & Nooteboom (2005) 
proposed the following, modified dimensions: scope of shared activities, i.e. the range of 
issues incorporated in the tie, frequency of interaction, duration of the relationship, trust and 
openness, and the extent of formal, contractual control. The scope of a tie refers to its content. 
Scope may refer to width and depth of knowledge shared, but also to different contents of 
knowledge, concerning technology, materials, sources, markets, government regulations, 
finance, accounting, and gossip on the technical or intentional reliability of potential or actual 
partners.  
   The following hypotheses were proposed for exploration networks. Duration should be 
low, since long duration would conflict with the need for network flexibility, for the sake of 
Schumpeterian novel combinations, and is likely to lead to too much reduction of cognitive 
distance as a source of innovation. Then high frequency of interaction is needed as an 
alternative way to recoup the specific investments relevant in exploration. High frequency is   13 
also consistent with the speed of developments associated with radical innovation. The limited 
viability of contracts in exploration, due to uncertainty, and the need to share tacit knowledge, 
in intensive and frequent interaction, plead for high trust and openness and low contractual 
control. The wide range of uncertainty that characterizes exploration, and the importance of 
reputation mechanisms, argued before, plead for a wide scope of ties. 
  Again, the hypotheses concerning networks for exploitation go in the opposite direction, 
although there are industry contingencies. In exploitation specific investments tend to be 
larger, with a longer economic life, requiring longer duration of relationships to recoup 
investments, while longer duration is less of a problem due to less volatility and the 
emergence of dominant designs in technology and organization. Dominant designs and 
codification and wider diffusion of knowledge yield less need for a high scope and high 
frequency of interaction. Due to less uncertainty contracts are more feasible, and they are 
more needed because due to lesser scope and frequency of interaction trust and openness are 
less, and due to lesser density of networks, argued before, reputation mechanisms are weaker. 
  Beyond the industry case studies of Gilsing & Nooteboom (2005), Gilsing et al. (2006) 
tested network effects on innovation in an econometric model, using the same data used by 
Nooteboom  et al. (2005) for testing the inverse U-shaped effect of cognitive distance, 
discussed earlier. In this model in addition to the effect of cognitive distance, effects were 
added of network density and centrality of a firm in the network. Here, the same approach 
was used as in Nooteboom et al. (2005), in the sense that separate effects were hypothesized 
on absorptive capacity and novelty value. In line with the logic of structural holes from Burt 
(1992), network density was hypothesized to have a negative effect on novelty value. In line 
with the logic set out above, density was hypothesized to have a positive effect on absorptive 
capacity. For centrality of the firm ‘betweenness centrality’ was taken, which measures the 
extent that a firm lies on shortest paths between other firms, and thus occupies a position at a 
‘crossroads’. Note the difference here between cognitive distance between any two firms, and 
‘social distance’ as the number of firms on the shortest path between any two firms. The 
hypothesis was that betweenness centrality has a positive effect on novelty value, with the 
firm able to cross information from many, also socially distant sources, and a negative effect 
on capacity to absorb such variety of information.          
 
Discussion   
 
In the model of Nooteboom et al. (2005), in addition to the inverse-U shaped effect of cognitive 
distance on innovation, illustrated in Figure 1, particularly for explorative innovation, and a positive 
effect of technological capital, accumulated from past R&D, on absorptive capacity, an additional, 
unexpected effect was found. Technological capital turned out not only to have a positive effect on the 
intercept of the line for absorptive capacity, as illustrated in Figure 1, but also to have a negative effect 
on the slope of the novelty line. This indicates an effect of decreasing returns to learning, or ‘boredom 
effect’, in the sense that the more one knows, the further away one has to go, at larger cognitive 
distance, to still find something new. This, then, comes in addition to an effect of increasing returns to 
knowledge, in the sense that the more one knows the easier it is to absorb something new. The upshot 
is that at very high levels (width and depth) of accumulated knowledge it is difficult for an 
organization to find outside sources of further new knowledge, and outside collaboration then focuses 
on relations at small cognitive distance, to exploit the large knowledge potential within the firm. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2, which reproduces the interaction of effects of cognitive distance and 
knowledge capital, according to the estimated model, for the range of observations in the study. The 
figure shows that for the highest observed level of technological capital optimal technological distance 
is zero.  
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---------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
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Concerning the effects of structure and strength of ties, while the two can and should be 
distinguished, there is interaction between them (cf. Rowley et al. 2000). For example, for governance 
one can use contracts or trust/openness (in tie strength), or, alternatively, density for the sake of social 
control (structure). Another example is that when specific investments are needed, to recoup those one 
needs either high frequency or long duration (strength), while the latter entails a certain stability of the 
network (structure). Here elements of structure and strength can substitute for each other. This gives an 
opportunity to reconcile the otherwise contrary effects of ‘weak ties’ vs. ‘closure’.  
What is the empirical evidence, in the extant literature? Rowley et al. (2000) made the 
customary hypotheses that in exploration density and strength of ties are negatively related 
and in exploitation are positively related to performance, and they concluded that ‘..our results 
do not strongly support the theoretical arguments regarding the main effects of strong ties or 
density …’. They did find evidence for the interaction effects between tie strength and 
structure. Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) found a positive effect of ‘multiple, redundant ties’ 
under exploration and Beerkens (2004) found empirical evidence for dense ties in exploration 
in three industries: chemicals, cars, and pharmaceuticals. Gilsing & Nooteboom (2005), in 
two qualitative case studies of exploration and exploitation in multi-media and biotechnology, 
found considerable evidence in favour of most of their hypotheses, contrary to previous 
literature, but not for all. Here, the focus is on the anomalies and their interpretation.  
Most of the anomalies were in exploration in biotechnology, in interaction between small 
biotech firms and universities. One of the theoretical arguments was that in exploration 
knowledge is more tacit, which complicates knowledge diffusion and the build-up of a joint 
understanding (competence), and also limits the use of contracts for formal control 
(governance). However, it turned out from the biotechnology case that while in exploration 
knowledge was indeed highly tacit in the exploration process, exploration outcome was highly 
codified, which, counter to the assumption, enabled governance by formal contracting and 
monitoring. Another empirical anomaly in biotechnological exploration was the moderate 
centralisation of the network structure, and the narrow scope of ties. The explanation of the 
latter lies in the highly science-based nature of biotechnology, which makes the role of 
universities and research institutes a more central one and eliminates the need to explore 
subjects related to organisation, production, marketing and distribution. The most important 
anomaly in biotechnological exploration was that network structure was stable and, 
correspondingly, ties had long duration. However, closer analysis showed a structure that did 
satisfy theoretical considerations, but in an unforeseen way, in a dual, ‘small world’-like 
structure, with a dense and stable core community ‘at home’, yielding high absorptive 
capacity with respect to less durable ties to such communities elsewhere. In this way, the 
potential for inertia in long local ties was compensated by continual influx of novelty from 
more flexible outside ties.       
In exploitation in multimedia, anomalies were: fairly high density and frequency of 
interaction. Related to that, governance can still be informal and trust-based, and serve as a 
complement to formal control. This deviation from hypotheses may be attributable to the fact 
that in the integration of a systemic technology some exploratory activity was still going on, 
in exploitation, which put limits on the codifiability of knowledge. Then, also in a setting of 
exploitation, high frequency is warranted and governance needs to be of a more informal type.  
An important characteristic of knowledge that varied between both industries was the 
extent to which it was systemic versus stand-alone knowledge (Teece 1986). This yields an 
important feature of the content of ties. This issue has received limited attention in the   15 
literature on networks and alliances (but see Teece 1986, Langlois and Robertson 1995). It 
yields important, relatively new insights. In multimedia, high density was needed to preserve 
systemic integrity of the emerging technological architecture while the combination of high 
frequency, short duration, wide scope and informal governance created cognitive diversity. In 
other words, stability in structure was needed in view of the systemic nature of  technology, 
while potential disadvantages of that were compensated by features of the ties.  
In sum, how structure and strength of ties enable and constrain learning and innovation in 
inter-firm networks depends on the extent to which knowledge is tacit versus codified as well 
as on the degree to which it is systemic or stand-alone. When knowledge and technology are 
systemic, this can require frequent interaction and informal governance even towards 
exploitation. Also, while knowledge can be tacit in exploration, the results of exploration can 
be codified, allowing for contractual control even in exploration. The most important 
conclusions perhaps is that in exploration local stability and density of structure, with ties of 
long duration, can be complemented by more sparse and flexible outside ties, in a small-world 
structure. 
The findings seem in line with the findings by Beerkens (2004) on the role of redundancy 
in networks in exploration and exploitation in chemicals, cars and pharmaceuticals. The 
findings concerning the interaction between structure and strength of ties is in line with the 
findings of Rowley et al. (2000). The results on industry effects are in line with a recent study 
by Hagedoorn et al. (2005), who found that understanding the phenomenon of repeated ties, 
as a dimension of tie duration, requires a careful consideration of the specific industrial 
context. Overall, the analysis yields some explanations of the ambiguity of empirical results in 
previous literature, as discussed in the introduction. The analysis shows that for this it is 
important to look at the interaction of structure and strength of ties from the perspective of 
both competence and governance.   
There are also interaction effects between cognitive distance, network density and 
centrality of a firm.  The hypotheses of Gilsing et al. (2006) concerning combined effects 
were almost completely confirmed. The model implies interaction effects. High cognitive 
distance or high centrality, both yielding high novelty value but low absorptive capacity, can 
be compensated with high network density to repair absorptive capacity. Alternatively, high 
centrality, yielding much novelty but a danger of information overload, may be 
complemented with alliances with firms at small cognitive distance to help absorb it.     
Some of the effects, according to the model estimate, are given in Figures 3 and 4. The 
graphs cover the range of observations.  
 
------------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
     
Figure 3 shows that within the range of observations, at mean network density we find 
that if betweenness centrality is high, yielding problems of absorptive capacity, one cannot 




Figure 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
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Figure 4 shows that even at the mean level of betweenness centrality one needs a certain 
amount of network density to yield requisite absorptive capacity, and an intermediate (not too 
high) level of technological distance is best at all levels of network density. 
 
   
Conclusions and research agenda 
 
There is a vibrant activity of ongoing research of innovation in IOR’s, in which the literatures 
on inter-firm alliances, with an emphasis on strategic behaviour of firms, and the literature on 
networks, with an emphasis on structural effects, are coming together in the study of strategy 
in networks. That constitutes progress. Important for innovation is the distinction, in recent 
research, between two dimensions of variety: number of actors and the structure of ties 
between them, and cognitive distances between them. Related to this is the distinction 
between cognitive distance, between any two firms, and social distance, defined as the 
number of intervening firms on the shortest path between the two firms.  
A shortcoming in much research still is the neglect to combine issues of competence and 
governance. That combination is needed to understand the otherwise contradictory results 
concerning positive and negative effects of network structure and strength of ties. For 
example, network density may have a negative effect on variety of knowledge and a positive 
effect on governance by means of reputation and coalition formation. For innovation, ties may 
need to be weak in duration, size of specific investments and formal contracting, but strong in 
frequency and scope of interaction, and in trust.    
The combination of competence and governance is also of great importance for policy. 
Focus only on governance can eliminate the variety and flexibility needed for innovation, 
while focus only on innovation can create havoc with firm interests, in unforeseen relational 
risks. Another point that is important for policy concerns trade-offs between variety and 
homogeneity and between stability and change. Variety, in numbers and cognitive distance, is 
beneficial for radical innovation, but a certain homogeneity and cognitive proximity is 
beneficial for collaboration. Hence one should make trade-offs and look for optimal variety 
and distance. Similarly, a certain flexibility and variability of relations is needed for 
innovation, but also a certain stability, to elicit and enable investments in mutual 
understanding and trust. Hence one should make trade-offs here as well, in looking for 
optimal rather than maximal flexibility. 
Another lesson, related to the combination of competence and governance, concerns the 
interaction between structure and strength of ties. Problems resulting from policy measures 
taken in the one may be compensated by measures taken in the other. There is also interaction 
between cognitive distance, density of networks and centrality of firms. For example, positive 
effects on novelty value combined with negative effects on absorptive capacity for cognitive 
distance and centrality may be compensated by positive effects on absorptive capacity for 
density. These results have important policy implications for firms. There is no one best 
network or one best position in a network. The research discussed in this chapter opens up a 
repertoire of strategies for innovation, in combinations and trade-offs between effects on 
innovative performance of decision variables concerning the choice of network structure 
(density), position (central or peripheral), (different dimensions of) strength of ties, and 
cognitive distance.   
Another lesson concerns contingencies of industry, in relation to contingencies in type of 
technology (systemic, stand-alone), type of knowledge (more or less tacit), and the different 
effects of tacitness of knowledge concerning products and tacitness in knowledge concerning 
production.    17 
Following up on the research that combines effects of network structure and strength of 
ties, and interaction between the two, and on research on effects of cognitive distance, 
network density and centrality in a network, and interactions between them, a challenge now 
is the complex task of combining all these factors. 
Following up on the research on the effect of the duration of a tie, a challenge is to include 
the modifying effect of exclusiveness of the relationship, e.g. in terms of non-overlapping ties 
with other firms that the two firms may have, as a source for revitalizing the relationship. This 
would combine the effect of duration with the notion of bridging a structural hole.     
A particularly interesting avenue for further research appears to lie in the notion of ‘small 
worlds’ (Watts 1999). There is empirical evidence, and theoretical argument, in favour of 
dense and stable local communities, with strong ties, for the sake of high collective absorptive 
capacity, which have more sparse, weak and flexible ties with more distant communities, to 
provide requisite variety for novelty.  
More attention is required for triads. On the whole, the literature has tended to focus on 
either two actors (dyads) or many (networks). While some attention has been given to triads, 
they have remained under-researched (Madhavan et al. 2004). Burt’s (1992) studies of 
bridging structural holes, and studies of roles of third parties or go-betweens (Shapiro 1987, 
Nooteboom 2002) entail three parties, but there the third party takes up a special intermediary 
position external to the relation between the other two actors. Simmel’s (1950) more 
extensive analysis of triads, in which any two can form a coalition against the third, who may 
then switch from the position of tertius gaudens emphasized by Burt to a problematic position 
of being caught ‘in the middle’ (Krackhardt 1999). As shown by Simmel, in triads any one of 
the three can help to solve problems between the other two, and there may be effects of 
rivalry between two in gaining favour from the third, etc. This could yield a source of 
inspiration for more extensive analysis of triads. The importance of triads goes beyond 
governance, and has implications for competence. This was already part of the earlier 
analysis: in a closed or transitive triangle, where each has a tie to the other two, two sides may 
triangulate their understanding of the third. There are also spillover effects. If A has a tie with 
B and B has a tie with C, and C is a potential competitor of A, then knowledge transferred 
from A to B may spill over to C, and for A’s control of spillover it matters a great deal 
whether or not A also has a tie with C. These are just some indicative examples of the 
importance of triads.  
  Knoke & Chermack (2005) showed that there is not only the issue whether ties are uni-
directional or symmetrical, which tends to be neglected, but also to what extent ties are 
acknowledged. A may claim a tie to B, as recipient or sender, which is not acknowledged by 
B. This can have important implications that seem to have been wholly neglected.  
Finally, there may be useful spillover from insights from inter-organizational relations to 
relations between units within organizations.  18 
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TABLE 1   
Sources of (Intentional) Reliability 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                macro;                micro; 
                universalistic            particularistic, relation-specific 
                institutional             organizational 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
self-interest 
opportunity control       contracts, legal enforcement      hierarchy, managerial ‘fiat’, 
 
incentive control            reputation      dependence: unique partner 
     value, switching costs, hostages  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
other-directed        social/moral values/norms      empathy, routinization, 
benevolence         of proper conduct,           identification, affect, friendship 
                sense of duty, bonds of  
                 kinship   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: adapted from Nooteboom (2002).    29 






































Source: Nooteboom (1999)  30
Figure 2 Exploration performance as a function of cognitive distance and technological 



















"Explorative patents"  31
Figure 3 Exploration performance as a function of betweenness centrality and cognitive 





































































At mean network density   32
Figure 4 Exploration performance as a function of network density and cognitive 




































































At mean normalized betweenness centrality